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WORKMAN COMPENSATION SUITS: A REJECTION OF
THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE
Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 445 U.S. 74 (1980)
The United States Supreme Court has ruled in Bloomer v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.' that a stevedore's lien for the amount of compensation
payments to an injured longshoreman under the Longshoremen and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act 2 against the longshoreman's recovery in a
negligence action against the shipowner may not be reduced by an amount
representing the stevedore's proportionate share of the longshoreman's legal
expenses in obtaining recovery from the shipowner. As a result, the
"equitable common fund" doctrine3 has no application to cases arising under
the Longshoremen and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act.
In an 8-1 decision,' the Court in Bloomer concluded another episode in
the judicial struggle over the distribution of amounts recovered in suits
brought by the longshoremen against a shipowner. The Court's decision
clearly indicates an intent to guarantee the stevedore full reimbursement for
all compensation benefits paid to the employee.
The episode began when Petitioner, William E. Bloomer, Jr., was injured
during the course of his employment on the vessel S.S. Pacific Breeze. Having
received $17,152.83 in compensation from Respondent, Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company,5 Bloomer brought a diversity suit against the owner of
the vessel alleging negligence on the part of the shipowner.' Respondent was
designated carrier of workers' compensation for Bloomer's employer, Connec-

1. Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 445 U.S. 74 (1980).
2. 33 U.S.C. 901, et seq. (1976).
3. The Equitable Common Fund Doctrine states that when a third person benefits from litigation instituted by another, courts should exercise their equitable powers to require that person to bear a portion of the expense of the suit. See Boeing Co. v.
Van Gemert, - U.S....
100 S.Ct. 225 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257-259 (1975); id. at 275-280 (Marshall, J. dissenting); Mills v. Electric Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S.
161 (1939).
4. Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 445 U.S. 74 (1980). Mr. Justice Blackmun dissented and filed an opinion. Id. at 88.
5. The designated carrier of workers' compensation for Bloomer's employer, Connecticut Terminal Company, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. is to be referred to as the
stevedore in the Court's opinion. Id. at 75 n.1.
6. Bloomer alleged that the shipowner had negligently created hazardous conditions on board the vessel, that the ship's deck was slippery and dangerous, and that as
a result he had fallen and incurred severe injuries. Id. at 75.

(106)
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ticut Terminal Company, and was therefore subrogated to all its rights under
the Act.
Bloomer notified Respondent of the pending action and requested that
Respondent reduce its lien by a share of the litigation costs Respondent
refused, asserting its right to full reimbursement.
Petitioner settled with the shipowner for $60,000 and moved for
summary judgment against the insurance company, arguing that Respondent's lien against the recovery from the shipowner be reduced by an amount
representing its proportionate share of the expenses of the suit against the
shipowner. Petitioner contended that since recovery from the shipowner
would benefit Respondent, equity required that Respondent bear a portion of
the expenses of obtaining that recovery
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied Petitioner's motion.' On Petitioner's appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court."° The court of appeals concluded
that a stevedore should not be required to pay a share of the longshoreman's
legal expenses in a suit brought against the shipowner." Certiorari was then
granted by the United States Supreme Court.'"
7. After receiving a compensation award from the stevedore, the longshoreman is
given six months within which to bring suit against the third party (i.e. the shipowner). 33 U.S.C. § 933(b). The stevedore is entitled to be reimbursed for any compensation
paid to the longshoreman out of the net proceeds of the recovery paid to the longshoreman by the third party. S. REP. No. 428, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1971]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2135.
8. Bloomer sought to have the fund distributed in the following manner:
$60,000.00
Recovery
(202.80)
less expenses

balance for distribution

59,797.20

(19,932.40)
less attorney's fee of one third
39,864.80
balance
17,152.83
lien of stevedore
less proportionate share of fees and expenses
(11,396.57)
(.3355866 x 17,152.83) (5,756.26)
28,468.23
net to Bloomer
Under this distribution, Bloomer would receive a total of $45,621.06, $5,756.26 over
and above the amount representing his $60,000 damages recovery minus expenses, 445
U.S. at 76.
9. 488 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
10. 586 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1978).
11. Id. at 911.
12. Certiorari was granted to determine whether a stevedore should be required to
pay a share of the longshoreman's legal expenses in a suit brought against the shipowner. The courts of appeals had been divided.
The Ninth and Fourth Circuits had held that the stevedore should be charged
with a share of the longshoremen's legal expenses, Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers,
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In affirming the decision of the court of appeals, Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, emphasized three points. 3 Each point was based upon
the Court's understanding of Congress's intentions in enacting the workmen's compensation statutes. According to the Court, these intentions were
made clear by the Act's language, structure and history.
As a first point, the Court indicated that Congress did not intend for the
stevedore to pay a portion of the legal expenses incurred in a suit by a
longshoreman because the Act did not expressly so provide.' This failure, the
Court pointed out, is in clear contrast to the explicit provision for distribution
of any amount obtained by the stevedore in a suit brought pursuant to its
assignment' from the longshoreman. The latter provision clearly provides
that the stevedore is not responsible for paying any of the expenses incurred
by it in its litigation against the shipowner."b Since Congress did not intend
the stevedore to pay legal expenses when it brought suit against the
shipowner pursuant to § 933(e), there is no reason to assume Congress should
intend the stevedore to pay these expenses when the longshoreman brings
the action.

7

Ltd., 605 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1979); Swift v. Bolton, 517 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1975). The
First Circuit, like the Second, has disallowed apportionment, Cella v. Partenreederei
MS Ravenna, 529 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976). The Fifth
Circuit has adopted a third approach calling for an individualized inquiry into whether
apportionment is fair in the particular case, Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappij
Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1978).
13. 445 U.S. at 77-88.
14. 445 U.S. at 78.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 933(c).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 933(e) provides:
Any amount recovered by such employer on account of such assignment,
whether or not as the result of a compromise, shall be distributed as follows:
(1) The employer shall retain an amount equal to
(A) the expenses incurred by him in respect to such proceedings or compromise (including a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the
deputy commissioner or Board);
(B) the cost of all benefits actually furnished by him to the employee
under Section 907 of this title;
(C) all amounts paid as compensation;
(D) the present value of all amounts thereafter payable as compensation ..... and the present value of the cost of all benefits thereafter to be furnished under Section 907 of this title . .

(2)

.;

and

The employer shall pay any excess to the person entitled to compensation
or to the representative, less one-fifth of such excess which shall belong to
the employer.
17. 445 U.S. at 78-79.
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As a second point, the Court noted that an evaluation of the history of
the Act indicates that double compensation on the part of the longshoreman

was clearly not contemplated by Congress."
However, the legislature did contemplate provision of full reimbursement to the stevedore for its compensation payment.' 9 The Court traced the
legislative history"0 of the original act and its subsequent amendments to
illustrate its point, that forcing the stevedore to pay any of the longshoreman's legal expenses would be the same as providing the longshoreman with
a double recovery," as he would be receiving a greater sum than would be
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. As originally enacted in 1927, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act required a longshoreman to choose between the receipt of a compensation award from his employer and a damages suit against the third party. If the longshoreman elected to receive compensation, his right of action was automatically
assigned to his employer. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 33, 44 Stat. 1440 (current
version at 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. (1976)).
In 1938, Congress provided that in cases in which compensation was not made
pursuant to an award by a deputy commissioner (appointed by the Secretary of Labor,
see 33 U.S.C. § 940), the longshoreman would not be required to choose between the
compensation award and an action for damages. No election was required unless compensation was paid pursuant to such an award. See Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 685, § 12,
13, 52 Stat. 1168. This version of the Act did not provide for distribution of amounts
recovered from the third party in a suit brought by the longshoreman. The lower courts
interpreted the Act to require that the stevedore be reimbursed for his compensation
payment out of the sum recovered from the third party. See e.g., The Etna, 138 F.2d 37
(3rd Cir. 1943); Miranda v. City of Galveston, 123 F. Supp. 889 (S.D. Tex. 1954); Fontana v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 106 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Weinfeld, J.) aff'd mem.
on opinion below sub nom, Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953).
Under the same version of the Act, the lower courts also decided that the
stevedore should not be required to bear a proportionate share of the longshoreman's
legal expenses. See Davis v. United States Lines Co., 253 F.2d 262 (3rd Cir. 1958);
Oleszczuk v. Calmar SS Corp., 163 F. Supp. 370 (D.C. Md. 1958); Fontana v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, 106 F. Supp. at .463-464.
In 1959, Congress amended the Act to delete the election of remedies requirement altogether. Act of August 18, 1959, Pub. L. 86-171, 73 Stat. 391, codified at 33
U.S.C. § 901 (1976). The longshoreman would have six months within which to bring
an action against a third party before the right of action was assigned to the stevedore.
The employer had to be reimbursed for any compensation paid to the employee out of
the net proceeds of the recovery. S. REP. No. 428, supra note 7, at 2135.
In 1972, Congress amended the Act to abolish the unseaworthiness remedy for
longshoremen, limited the longshoreman's action against the shipowner to one based
on negligence and eliminated the third party action by the shipowner against the stevedore. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4702.
21. 445 U.S. at 79.
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possible in an ordinary suit for damages. The stevedore, on the other hand,
would not be fully reimbursed. Such inequality in the respective positions of
the two parties violates the legislative purposes made clear by the express
provisions of the Act.22
The Court carefully examined the hearings on the amendments and
noted that Congress purposely elected not to change the existing rule. 3 The
Court did recognize a substantial effort on the part of Congress to assist the
longshoreman by amending the Act in 1972,1 but it once again noted that
Congress had had the opportunity to, but did not, modify the Act to require
the stevedore to pay its share of the legal expenses.' This failure to act on the
part of Congress was indicative of a congressional intent to disallow a
proration of the legal expenses. Therefore, the Court did not feel justified in
taking steps to modify the Act on its own.2"
As a third point, the Court noted that its interpretation of the Act is
necessary to insure proper results." This interpretation allows the longshoreman to receive an amount no less than that which he would receive in an
ordinary negligence action, disallows a windfall at the expense of the
stevedore, and guarantees that the stevedore receive reimbursement for the
full amount of its compensation payment to the longshoreman.
The Court pointed out that the structure of the Act was changed to
insure that stevedores would have sufficient funds to pay improved compensation benefits to longshoremen.' This could only be guaranteed if the
stevedore was protected from huge litigation costs formerly incurred in third
party actions.' The Court suggested that forcing the stevedore to pay
litigation expenses would only benefit the lawyers, not the injured
longshoreman.30
The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Blackmun,' characterized the
Court's approach as one which "relegates the injured longshoreman's welfare
to secondary status, well behind the interest of his stevedore employer in

22. 33 U.S.C. § 933(e).
23. 445 U.S. at 81 n.6.
24. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 1, et seq., 86 Stat. 1263 amending
33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. (1970) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972).
25. 445 U.S. at 81 n.6.
26. Id. at 85-86.
27. Id. at 86.
28. Id. at 83-84.
29. Id.
30. 445 U.S. at 83, 85 n.11.
31. Id. at 88.
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conserving resources."32 He noted that under the Court's rule, the stevedore
has everything to gain and nothing to lose. 3
This result, he indicated, cannot be reconciled either with the Court's
espoused view that the Act is to be construed with the interests of the
longshoreman foremost in mind, ' or the modem concept that the industrial
enterprise, rather than the injured workman, should bear the costs of
industrial accidents.'
In analyzing the Court's argument of the failure of the Act to expressly
provide that the stevedore should pay a portion of the longshoreman's legal
expenses as indicative of an intent that the stevedore not pay such a portion,
Justice Blackmun claimed that the Court had "oversimplified the variegated
history of the judicial 'rule', ha[d] overdrawn the clarity of the congressional
approval of it, and ha[d] failed to adequately consider the impact of the 1972
amendments on the 'rule' .36

A review of the existing case law demonstrated that the rule of
nonpayment by a stevedore of a longshoreman's litigation expenses has not
achieved the broad acceptance implied by the Majority's opinion.3 7 As pointed
out to the contrary by Justice Blackmun, there is authority that indicates no
settled judicial construction8 of the rule.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 445 U.S. at 89.
37. Fontana v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 106 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd mem.
sub nom Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886
(1953) and Davis v. United States Lines Co., 253 F.2d 262 (3rd Cir. 1958), held that
attorney fees for a third party action must be borne in their entirety by the long-

shoreman.
However, in the Fourth, Fifth and possibly Second Circuits, alternative
approaches have been used.
In Ballwanz v. Jarka Corp., 382 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), it was the difference
in interests and the lack of true benefit to the stevedore, and not the arguments advanced in Fontana and Davis, that led the Fourth Circuit to refuse a proration of fees.
In Chouest v. A & P Boat Rentals, Inc., 472 F.2d 1026, 1035-36, cert. denied,
412 U.S. 949 (1973), the Fontana-Davis "rule" was displaced in the Fifth Circuit by an
approach that, in certain circumstances, required the longshoreman and stevedore to
"pay attorney fees and litigation expenses in proportion to their recoveries."
In the Second Circuit, the Fontana-Davis approach has not been uniformly
followed. Landon v. Lief Hoegh Co., 521 F.2d 756, 761 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1053 (1976), treated the compensation lien as an "express trust for the benefit of
the employer" with the longshoreman as statutory trustee.
38. 445 U.S. at 92.
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Justice Blackmun viewed the congressional inaction as an indication
that Congress regarded the allocation of a recovery as a matter best left to a
balancing of equities by the Court.3 It is clear that in Justice Blackmun's
view, the equities would be balanced only if the stevedore paid an allocation
of the costs of bringing the suit directly proportional to the recovery he
40
received from the suit.

Second, Justice Blackmun proposed that congressional concern, as
evidenced in the 1972 amendments, 4' was primarily for the workman and not
4'2
for the stevedore employer, as indicated by the Court. Therefore, the
purpose of protecting the stevedore fr'om litigation expenses was only to
provide a real increase in actual benefits to the worker. 3 It would be absurd
then, according to Justice Blackmun, to prevent proration of the attorney fees
merely because such would result in a real increase in payment to the
longshoreman.
Third, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the supposed windfall the
longshoreman would receive if the stevedore had to contribute a proportionate share of the litigation expenses, is, in effect, a fiction.4 4 He noted that
each cost the longshoreman pays out constitutes a reduction in his recovery
for his adjudicated injury.' Any payment by the stevedore, then, would only
assist in alleviating this reduction from the longshoreman's recovery. The
6
payment would not, however, provide the longshoreman with a windfall.! So
remains less than his actual
long as the longshoreman's total compensation
47
damages there is no true "double recovery.
To illustrate the absurdity of the Court's placement of the stevedore's
interests above those of the longshoreman's, Justice Blackmun asked
whether the Court would rule the same way if presented with a case where
the third party recovery was so small that virtually nothing would be left for
the longshoreman after payment of attorney fees and reimbursement of the
stevedore's lien.'
Given the reasoning developed by Justice Blackmun in his dissent, it is
difficult to comprehend the result reached by the Court in Bloomer. The
Majority did point out that nothing in their decision suggests that the
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
445 U.S. at 93-94.
See supra note 24.
445 U.S. at 94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
445 U.S. at 95.
Id.
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stevedore's lien has priority over the longshoreman's expenses. 9 However,
there appears to be nothing in the Court's opinion, besides that statement in
a footnote, 50 to suggest otherwise. The Bloomer opinion appears to indicate
that unless Congress specifically provides otherwise, the primary concern of
the courts is to protect the stevedore's interest. This position cannot be
reconciled with the purpose or role of employment compensation.
The effect of this decision may be to dissuade longshoremen from
bringing suit against the shipowners, unless they can be absolutely certain of
receiving a substantially greater recovery in their negligence action against
the shipowner than that of the statutory compensation benefit 5 ' received from
the stevedore. This result is due to the requirement that the longshoreman
first pay his attorney and litigation expenses from his recovery and, second,
reimburse the stevedore for the full amount of compensation benefits already
advanced. Depending on the amount of money which remains after all these
deductions, the longshoreman may regret his expense of time and emotion in
a suit against the shipowner. This result appears to be in direct conflict with
the expressed purpose of the amendments to the Act 2 ; the purpose was to
enable the employee to bring a third party liability suit.0
Under the law prior to the amendments the employee had to choose
between receiving the compensation benefits or pursuing a lawsuit against a
third party.' He could not elect to do both. Usually, the employee chose to
receive the compensation benefits to meet immediate and necessary expenses. The purpose of the amendments was to permit the employee to take
both actions, without forfeiting either right."

49. 445 U.S. at 86 n.13.
"Respondent does not challenge the approach adopted in Fontana v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 106 F. Supp. 461, 463-464 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affid mem. on opinion below
sub noma. Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886
(1953), under which the expenses of suit, including attorney fees, represent the first
charge on the recovery against the third party. See S. REP. No. 428, note 7. Under this
view, if the recovery against the shipowner is less than the sum of the lien and the
expenses of suit, the longshoreman will receive the full amount of his expenses even if
the remainder is insufficient to reimburse the stevedore for its lien. See Valentino v.
Rickners Rhederei G.M.B.H. etc., 552 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1977). We do not today address
the Valentino situation, and contrary to the implication of the dissent, nothing in our
decision suggests that the stevedore's lien has priority over the longshoreman's expenses." Id.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 2.
52. See supra note 7.
53. See S. REP. No. 428, supra note 7 at 2135.
54. Id. at 2134.
55. Id. at 2135.
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The current interpretation by the Majority appears to harken to a time
before the amendments. The employee does technically have the right to elect
both choices. However, one must question the efficacy of these rights, when it
appears that one right is not financially worthy of pursuit.
The Court, does, in a footnote," make it clear that this decision is not
intended to give the stevedore's lien priority over the longshoreman's
expenses. Thus, if after deduction of attorney fees and litigation expenses, the
longshoreman finds that he has a recovery less than the amount originally
obtained in the compensation payment from the stevedore, he will not have
to fully reimburse that party. Nevertheless, the longshoreman is certainly
not guaranteed any benefit from having undertaken the expense and stress of
7
He may decide it is not worthwhile to initiate a suit. Essentially,
litigation.6
one of his options has been eliminated. Assuming this result to be a
legitimate possibility, why has Congress established a six-month periods
within which the longshoreman is given priority to initiate the suit? This is a
question the Majority has apparently failed to address in its opinion, and is
an issue this author feels needs to be addressed. Contrary to the longshoreman, the stevedore is arguably rewarded for initiation of a suit. When he
initiates a suit against a shipowner, he becomes entitled to deduct from the
recovery proceeds all compensation benefits originally advanced to the
59
longshoreman, all court costs and all attorney fees. Only after these
deductions are made, does the longshoreman become entitled to any of the
proceeds.60 Even then, the longshoreman is only entitled to receive four-fifths
of the net proceeds. The stevedore is entitled to keep the remaining one-fifth
61
of the net proceeds as compensation for its efforts in bringing the suit.
The Majority appears to emphasize the specific congressional inclusion
of the stevedore provision as proof that Congress intended to protect his
2
interest. A closer examination of legislative history reveals, however, that
Congress intended this provision as a means of protecting the longshoremen's
interests. The purpose of the "reward" to the stevedore was not to encourage
the stevedore to initiate the suit, but rather to act as an incentive to the
stevedore to obtain the largest possible settlement or recovery in an action,
rather than settling for the amount of the compensation benefit paid to the
longshoreman.6 This purpose benefits the longshoreman.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

445 U.S. at 88 n.15.
Id.
See supra note 7.
33 U.S.C. § 933(e).
Id.
Id.
See supra note 20.
Id.

BLOOMER V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.

115

Since the purpose of specifically providing for the allocation of recovery
proceeds was not to benefit the stevedore, but rather to benefit the
longshoreman, the argument advanced by the Majority of a lack of specific
congressional intent to benefit the longshoreman vis A vis recovery proceeds,
must fail. A more plausible interpretation of Congress's failure to specifically
provide for the proration of expenses is that Congress felt such a provision
was not necessary in light of the articulated purpose of the Act to benefit
longshoremen.
The legislative history of the Act clearly provides that the purpose of the
Act is the protection of the longshoreman. In this author's opinion, the
Bloomer Majority has failed to interpret the Act in a way compatible with its
purpose.
Linda A. Brandt

